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THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960.

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**INTELLIGENCE LAG
OFTEN LAID TO U. S.****Many Critics Have Charged
Inadequacy of Efforts to
Obtain Foreign Secrets**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 8. The shooting down of an "informant" gathering U-2 plane over the Soviet Union has called attention to the history of this country's intelligence activities. Until World War II the United States had no major intelligence activities. There have been many complaints in Congress and in the country's chief reliance was Government reports of the on-ordinary terms of military intelligence operated by the armed services.

Even in World War II the Office of Strategic Services was engaged in espionage than in efforts at sabotage coordinated with military operations. The O. S. S. functioned under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Skilled Aviator Chosen

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The skills required for such a mission are in fact little different from those needed to carry out the high-altitude weather observation program that was used as a cover.

That the mission failed at this particularly sensitive period of diplomatic negotiations in some of the ways typified the history of the United States intelligence activities. There have been many complaints in Congress and in the country's chief reliance was Government reports of the on-ordinary terms of military intelligence operated by the armed services.

One of the biggest complaints came in the report in 1954 of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, headed by former President Herbert Hoover. It said:

"The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence data from the Iron Curtain. Proper of appropriate intelligence data from the Iron Curtain is essential to achieve Soviet Union's strength."

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C. I. A. HEAD: Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

over officially acknowledged as Central Intelligence Group in January, 1948. This was succeeded by the Central Intelligence Agency, created under a result of the National Security Act of 1947.

At Antietam and in World War II, Allen W. Dulles, one of Mr. II, the United States' naval air Donovan's aides in the O. S. S., victory at Midway was largely is the fifth director of the C. I. A., a result of the United States and has served in that post, having broken a Japanese code longest, from 1953 to the present.

The need to understand the political climate of a country is a political climate of a country. The size of his staff is a political climate of a country. So is the amount it and its road political and economic.

It has been reported that the total annual bill for United States intelligence activities approximates \$2,000,000,000, of which the C. I. A. spends half. The agency has been reported to employ 12,000 to 18,000 study the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and in 1938 the span-thousands of foreign-born personnel.

Officially, the C. I. A. has been described repeatedly as a coordinating agency. That is, it has no intelligence service. Its mission has been described as that of correlating the reports received from military intelligence units, United States diplomats and other agencies.

Even in the U-2 incident, for example there has been no official statement that the C. I. A. was at all involved. The pilot was identified as a former Air Force flier, working on a contract for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The National Intelligence estimate that it needed to develop secret information resources as well as demonstrating the techniques of nuclear weapons and the British-French and Israeli efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

The U-2 was sent on the mission of penetrating the Soviet Union's defense system. The mission was not the surprise of the Soviet Union, but the surprise of the United States. Those believe that country intelligence agencies, do not like the United States, has not.

Secret military bases present a continuing threat of surprise attack.

Francis G. Powers, the young flier who was sent on the mission, was not the mutton-chinned type of international spy. He was an expert aviator chosen because he could pilot a small jet plane at heights of five to ten miles and use various types of electronic and radar equipment and a special camera.

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
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Mr. Lord: George, I thought we'd stashed those trousers below!


Mr. Taylor: You never can tell when a customer might show up, Sam.

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Even in World War II, the Office of Strategic Services was engaged less in espionage than in efforts at sabotage coordinated with military operations. The O. S. S. functioned under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Skilled Aviator Chosen
The incident of the U-2 plane illustrates why the United States felt that it needed to develop secret information resources, as well as demonstrating the techniques required in the modern era of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

The U-2 was sent on the hazardous mission of penetrating the airspace of the Soviet Union because that country, unlike the United States, has not divulged the location of its major missile-launching sites.

Secret military bases present a continuing threat of surprise attack.

Francis G. Powers, the young flier who was sent on the mission, was not the motion-picture type of international spy. He was an expert aviator chosen because he could pilot a small jet plane at heights of five to ten miles and use various types of electronic and radar equipment and a special camera.

The skills required for such a mission are in fact little different from those needed to carry out the high-altitude weather observation program that was used as a cover. That the mission failed at a particularly sensitive period of diplomatic negotiations in some ways typified the history of United States intelligence activities. There have been many complaints in Congress and in Government reports of the ineffectiveness of this country's intelligence operations.

Complaint by Hoover Group
One of the biggest complaints came in the report in 1954 of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, headed by former President Herbert Hoover. It said:

"The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain. Proper leadership, boldness, and persistence are essential to achieve the desired results."

The complaint was echoed two years later, after the routs to new efforts in Poland, Poland, the unsuccessful Hungarian revolt, and the British, French, and Israeli offensives in Egypt.

The first famous American saboteur who served behind British lines in the American Revolution. Some observers speculate on the possibility that Hiss and Mr. Powers may have been the only two agents sent to Hungary, caught by surprise in the Middle East.



C. I. A. HEAD: Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Hungary, caught by surprise in the Middle East.

More recently, the United States' ability to obtain information from behind the Iron Curtain became a subject of newspaper headlines as a result of apparently conflicting testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Soviet Union's missile strength.

It is expected that the U-2 episode will lead to new efforts to review the origins of United States intelligence activities as well as their purpose and their effectiveness.

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ever officially acknowledged as Central Intelligence Group in spies by the United States. In the Civil War it is noteworthy that General McClellan had a copy of his opponent's battle order when he fought Lee at Antietam. And in World War II, the United States' naval-air victory at Midway was largely a result of the United States' longest, from 1943 to the present. The need to understand the political climate of a country and its real political and economic resources was underscored by Hitler's seizure of power and aggressive rule.

The late William J. Donovan, a lawyer and World War I hero, undertook on his own in 1935 to study the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and in 1938 the Spanish Civil War. In 1940 he went to Britain on a United States Navy mission to study intelligence techniques there.

For a year, Mr. Donovan observed anti-Nazi resistance movements in the Balkans and in the Middle East. "Upon my return," he wrote afterward, "Roosevelt called me to Washington and asked me to draft a plan for a new intelligence service cut to fit global war. You will have to begin with nothing," he said in effect, "we have no intelligence service."

The Office of Strategic Services was formed in June, 1942, by executive order, with Mr. Donovan at the head. It was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with providing a secret intelligence service working behind enemy lines, sabotage, morale, subversion, guerrilla organizations and aid to partisan resistance.

After the war, Mr. Donovan insisted that the United States must continue and even broaden its intelligence operations. President Truman established the ways.

Officially, the C. I. A. has been described repeatedly as a coordinating agency, that is, it has disclaimed having agents of its own. Its mission has been described as that of correlating the reports received from military intelligence units, United States diplomats and other agencies.

Even in the U-2 incident, for example, there has been no official statement that the C. I. A. was at all involved. The plane was identified as a former Air Force flier, working on a civilian contract for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, a nonmilitary unit.

The National Intelligence estimate, which is presented regularly to the President and other high officials, is prepared by representatives of the military services, the State and Defense Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission and similar units with the C. I. A. acting as chairman. The information can have been obtained in many ways.



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